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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan
This Article covers the period from June 1, 2011 through May 31,
2012.1 As it does every year, the Georgia Supreme Court decided a
number of lawyer-discipline cases and other matters related to licensure.
The supreme court and the Georgia Court of Appeals decided cases
involving legal malpractice, ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney
disqualification, and judicial ethics. The State Bar of Georgia Formal
Advisory Opinion Board took several actions that relate to the professional responsibilities of Georgia lawyers, and the supreme court
promulgated a number of changes to the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct.
I.

LAWYER DISCIPLINE

Disbarments2
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred eight lawyers during the survey
period for misconduct that was primarily, if not exclusively, financial.
One lawyer voluntarily surrendered his license because in two cases, he
settled claims for clients but did not notify them of the receipt of the
funds or deliver or account for them.' The court disbarred another
attorney because he collected funds in numerous garnishment actions,

A.

* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979);

University of Sussex (MA, 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics law during the prior survey period, see
Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 63 MERCER L. REV.
217 (2011).
2. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition for
voluntary discipline. The acceptance of a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting

of a petition for voluntary discipline or disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the
court and are treated as such in this Article. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-110
(2011).
3. In re Gammage, 290 Ga. 440, 440-41, 721 S.E.2d 902, 902-03 (2012).
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but he failed to deliver the funds and instead commingled them with his
own.4 Another lawyer settled cases for three clients and converted the
proceeds to his own use.5 The court disbarred a lawyer because he
collected money for a client on a promissory note but did not notify the
client or deliver the money; instead, the lawyer commingled the funds
with his own and failed to communicate with the client about the status
of the matter.' Another attorney lost his license after he purported to
represent a client in a real estate transaction while the lawyer's license
to practice law was suspended, and in connection with that transaction
the lawyer wrongfully withheld $18,000 in funds that the client had
deposited with the lawyer.7 A lawyer was disbarred for converting
$30,000 to his own use and not following his client's instructions as to
disbursement of an additional $330,000.8 The court disbarred another
lawyer who, in his third year of practice, settled a case for $2,250
without the client's authority and took the money for his own use.9
Justice Benham dissented on the basis that a two-year suspension would
have been more appropriate, given that the lawyer had little experience
and no prior disciplinary history.10
The court disbarred eight lawyers during the survey period primarily
for abandonment of clients. One lawyer accepted advance payments
from three clients but neither completed the work nor returned the
money, and he eventually became totally unresponsive to the clients. 1
Another lawyer, who had a lengthy disciplinary history, lost his license
because he solicited employment to represent a client in a criminal case
but did not appear for the client's bond hearing and did not respond to
telephone calls from the client or the client's mother. 12 One attorney
abandoned six clients and was convicted of a misdemeanor charge of
theft of services.'" The court disbarred her despite her claims, otherwise unsupported, that her misconduct resulted from health problems. 4

4. In re Johnson, Jr., 290 Ga. 364, 364-65, 720 S.E.2d 637, 638 (2012).
5. In re Henderson, Jr., 289 Ga. 837, 837-38, 716 S.E.2d 223, 224 (2011).
6. In re Lakes, 289 Ga. 392, 393, 711 S.E.2d 693, 693-94 (2011).
7. In re Suttle, 290 Ga. 368, 368-69, 720 S.E.2d 638, 639 (2012).
8. In re Herrmann, 291 Ga. 88, 89, 727 S.E.2d 497, 498 (2012).
9. In re Wathen, 290 Ga. 438, 438-39, 721 S.E.2d 899, 900 (2012).
10. Id. at 440, 721 S.E.2d at 900 (Benham, J., dissenting).
11. In re Evans, 289 Ga. 744, 744, 715 S.E.2d 131, 131-32 (2011).
12. In re Anthony, 290 Ga. 436,437-38, 721 S.E.2d 901, 901-02 (2012). The court had
suspended Mr. Anthony for eighteen months just a few months before this decision because
the lawyer had failed to take action for a client, return the client's calls, or surrender
papers from the client's file. In re Anthony, 289 Ga. 834, 835, 716 S.E.2d 221, 222 (2011).
13. In re Brown, 289 Ga. 912, 912-13, 717 S.E.2d 217, 217-18 (2011).
14. Id. at 913-14, 717 S.E.2d at 218.
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The court disbarred a lawyer who failed to appear for a client's hearing,
did not respond to repeated attempts by the client to contact her, did not
refund the fee, and made false statements in the disciplinary proceedings."6 Another lawyer lost his license because he accepted fees but
abandoned a series of bankruptcy clients.'6 The court disbarred a
lawyer who, in a federal case, stopped communicating; the client learned
that the court had granted summary judgment against her only when
she hired another lawyer. 7 Finally, a lawyer who had been disciplined
twice before for abandoning clients was disbarred because he filed a
claim to enforce a mechanic's lien too late, failed to appear for the
hearing, did not inform the client of the dismissal, and obtained a
"release" from the client but falsified the notarization and 8failed to
advise the client to seek the advice of an independent lawyer.
Three lawyers voluntarily surrendered their licenses because they-pled
guilty to felonies. One pled guilty to four counts of forgery." Another
admitted that he violated federal law against bringing in or harboring
aliens.20 The third entered a guilty plea to bank and wire fraud in
connection with 21a real estate transaction for which he acted as the
closing attorney.
The court disbarred three lawyers because they had been disbarred in
other states. One had lost his license in Florida because of improper
withdrawals from his trust account and because he inappropriately
certified that his trust account was in compliance with the rules.22
Another was disbarred, also in Florida, because she did not cease
practicing law after she had been suspended indefinitely. 2' The third
lost her license in the District of Columbia because she filed a fraudulent
payment for services she had not rendered to an
voucher seeking
24
indigent client.
Finally, five lawyers were disbarred for other reasons. One had a
significant history of prior discipline and lied to two clients when he told

15. In re Davis, 290 Ga. 857, 859-61, 725 S.E.2d 216, 218-20 (2012).
16. In re Bach, 291 Ga. 50, 50-51, 727 S.E.2d 496, 496 (2012).
17. In re Hayes, 291 Ga. 90, 90-91, 727 S.E.2d 498, 499 (2012).
18. In re Dicks, No. S12Y0769 (Ga. Apr. 24,2012), vacated, No. S12Y0769 (Ga. May 29,
2012) (remanding case to the special master for evidentiary hearing regarding mental
impairment of attorney as possible mitigating circumstance).
19. In re Fuller, 290 Ga. 75, 75, 717 S.E.2d 477, 477 (2011).
20. In re Dixit, 290 Ga. 373, 373-74, 720 S.E.2d 646, 646 (2012); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2006).
21. In re Green, 290 Ga. 372, 372-73, 720 S.E.2d 644, 644 (2012).
22. In re Kirkland, 290 Ga. 77, 77, 717 S.E.2d 477, 478 (2011).
23. In re Himes, 290 Ga. 232, 232-33, 719 S.E.2d 497, 497-98 (2011).
24. In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 290 Ga. 78, 78, 717 S.E.2d 478, 478 (2011).
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them that default judgments had not been entered in their cases; the
lawyer's response to the complaint contained a forged signature for the
notary.2" Another was disbarred after being suspended for failing to
pay bar dues and not fulfilling continuing legal education requirements,
but nevertheless representing a client in a real estate transaction. 6
Yet another lawyer created and introduced false evidence at a trial in
support of her own personal injury claim.' Finally, the court disbarred
two lawyers with no prior disciplinary history after more than a decade
of litigation because the lawyers used "runners" to obtain business.28
Justice Melton and Justice Hines dissented in that case because
disbarment was too severe a punishment in light of the punishment
given in similar cases.9
B.

Suspensions
The supreme court unanimously issued indefinite or lengthy suspensions in three cases. One lawyer who had experienced unspecified
personal or emotional problems was suspended indefinitely for abandoning a client. 30 The court imposed as conditions of reinstatement that
the lawyer pay restitution to the client and obtain a certification that
the lawyer is mentally competent to practice law. 1 Another was
suspended for five years as reciprocal discipline after he was suspended
for that time in North Carolina for assisting in mortgage fraud and for
intentionally misleading the courts. 2 One lawyer closed her law firm
without telling her clients and submitted false information in letters to
the bar about clients whose claims were apparently handled by nonlawyers who purported to act on behalf of the closed firm. She was
suspended for three years and may be reinstated only if she obtains a
certification from a licensed social worker and a finding from the Review
Panel that she is competent to practice law.3
Another lawyer received a three-year suspension, with reinstatement
conditioned upon a certification that no physical impairment impedes his
ability to practice law,3' over the dissent of three Justices. 5 In one

25. In re Warnock, 289 Ga. 456, 456, 711 S.E.2d 726, 726 (2011).
26. In re Robinson, 290 Ga. 74, 74-75, 717 S.E.2d 476, 476-77 (2011).
27. In re Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96, 96, 727 S.E.2d 502, 502-03 (2012).
28. In re Sinowski, 290 Ga. 303, 303-04, 305, 720 S.E.2d 597, 597-99 (2012).
29. Id. at 306-07, 720 S.E.2d at 600 (Melton, J., dissenting). The Author testified before
the special master on behalf of Mr. Sinowski and Mr. Freedman.
30. In re Junco, 289 Ga. 390, 390-91, 711 S.E.2d 691, 692 (2011).
31. Id. at 390, 711 S.E.2d at 692.
32. In re Erickson, 290 Ga. 369, 369-70, 720 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (2012).
33. In re Wofford, 289 Ga. 831, 831-32, 716 S.E.2d 219, 220 (2011).
34. In re Peterson, 290 Ga. 794, 796, 725 S.E.2d 252, 254 (2011).
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matter, the lawyer failed to send a client his file after the representation
ended and falsely told the Investigative Panel that he had done so. In
another matter, the lawyer was appointed to serve as appellate counsel
in a criminal case but did not order the transcript or work on the appeal
before lying to the Office of General Counsel about it or before a formal
complaint was filed. The lawyer submitted letters of support and some
evidence of health issues but also had a prior disciplinary history.36
Although the special master recommended a one-year suspension, a bare
majority of the supreme court issued the three-year suspension.3 7 The
dissent emphasized that the lawyer had been untruthful with the
Investigative Panel and the Office of General Counsel, and it noted the
lack of any substantial evidence of a physical impairment. 38 The three
dissenting justices would have disbarred the lawyer."s
The court issued suspensions of between one and three years in five
cases, one of which has already been discussed in the previous paragraph. One lawyer was suspended for eighteen months because she had
a prior disciplinary history and had entered into a fee-splitting
relationship with a non-lawyer and then lied about it to the Office of
General Counsel.4 ° Another lawyer pled guilty to the felony of aggravated assault but avoided disbarment, receiving instead a suspension of
approximately seventeen months, because he had no disciplinary history
and because he affirmatively sought and received extensive treatment
for post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol abuse.4 ' The court
suspended a lawyer for eighteen months because the lawyer withdrew
from representing a client, did not refund the client's money, kept the
file, and did not keep a proper accounting of her trust account; the court
described her conduct as "inexcusable" and her attitude toward the
disciplinary process as "cavalier."4 2 Finally, a lawyer received an
eighteen-month suspension for "wholesale abandonment" of a client who
suffered an adverse judgment as a result of the lawyer's failure to
appear in court or communicate with the client.'
The court suspended three lawyers for one year. One was a solo
bankruptcy practitioner who neither investigated when a client's
property was scheduled for foreclosure nor filed a bankruptcy petition to
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (Nahmias, J., dissenting).
Id. at 795-96, 725 S.E.2d at 253-54 (majority opinion).
Id. at 795-96, 725 S.E.2d at 254.
Id. at 796-97, 725 S.E.2d at 254-55 (Nahmias, J., dissenting).
Id. at 798, 725 S.E.2d at 255.
In re O'Brien-Carriman, 291 Ga. 27, 27, 29, 727 S.E.2d 93, 94-95 (2012).
In re Seshul, Jr., 289 Ga. 910, 910-12, 717 S.E.2d 262, 262-63 (2011).
In re McFaI, 289 Ga. 829, 830, 716 S.E.2d 221, 221 (2011).
In re Jones, 289 Ga. 835, 836-37, 716 S.E.2d 222, 223 (2011).
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stop the sale." Another had been suspended for one year in North
Carolina for representing clients with adverse interests and received the
same discipline in Georgia. 45 The court suspended the third lawyer
because he borrowed a client's money from his trust account twice and
on several occasions took money that was not his from a joint account
with the same client.46 Because the client was made whole, the lawyer
had no disciplinary history, and the lawyer was cooperative with the
investigation, the court imposed a one-year suspension.4 7
The supreme court issued six suspensions of less than one year. The
court accepted the voluntary petition for discipline of a lawyer who had
willfully and deceitfully obstructed efforts to obtain discovery about the
lawyer's assets that were available to satisfy a contempt judgment.48
Another lawyer pled guilty as a first offender to tampering with evidence
and obstruction of a law enforcement officer in connection with a dispute
with an employee.49 The court noted in mitigation the lack of a
disciplinary history and the facts that the lawyer was undergoing
emotional problems of a non-recurring nature at the time, had primary
responsibility as a single mother for two minor children, made a goodfaith effort to rectify the consequences of her violations, and cooperated
with the bar.50
A lawyer with no disciplinary history but with serious personal
problems, including alcoholism and depression, was suspended for six
months as a result of, among other things, failures to communicate,
return a client's file, prepare adequately for trial, and deposit a client's
funds into his trust account.51 Another lawyer with no disciplinary
history settled a client's claim without authority and deposited the funds
into his trust account, which at several points did not contain enough
funds to cover what was owed to the client.52 The lawyer paid the
client in full without deducting any fees and successfully petitioned the
court for a six-month suspension.53 A lawyer who was suspended in
Florida for forty-five days for falsifying affidavits as a very new lawyer
at the direction of his boss received reciprocal discipline in Georgia.54

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

In re Miller, 291 Ga. 30, 30, 727 S.E.2d 124, 124 (2012).
In re Sossomon, 290 Ga. 677, 677-78, 725 S.E.2d 243, 244 (2012).
In re Carragher, Jr., 289 Ga. 826, 827, 829, 716 S.E.2d 216, 218-19 (2011).
Id. at 828-29, 716 S.E.2d at 218-19.
In re Bonner, 289 Ga. 838, 838-39, 716 S.E.2d 224, 224-25 (2011).
In re Thompson, 289 Ga. 453, 454, 711 S.E.2d 724, 725 (2011).
Id. at 455, 711 S.E.2d at 725.
In re Huggins, 291 Ga. 92, 92-93, 727 S.E.2d 500, 500-01 (2012).
In re Terrell, 291 Ga. 91, 91, 727 S.E.2d 499, 499 (2012).
Id. at 91-92, 727 S.E.2d at 499-500.
In re Hutt, 291 Ga. 171, 171-72, 728 S.E.2d 552, 553-54 (2012).
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Finally, a lawyer was suspended for thirty days as a matter of reciprocity because he received that punishment in Tennessee for failing to
account for funds held in a fiduciary capacity in one case and for failing
to keep a client informed or disclose a conflict of interest in another
55
case.
C.

Reprimands

The supreme court approved Review Panel reprimands in eight cases.
In one, the lawyer sent a client letters about a pending summary
judgment motion to the wrong address; when the client did not respond,
the lawyer effectively withdrew but did not obtain court permission to
do so or notify the client of his withdrawal or the judgment entered
against the client by the court.56 The court accepted the petition for
voluntary discipline from a lawyer who became embroiled in a fee
dispute with a client and, among other things, created a contract for
legal services to replace the one she believed the client had removed
from her files and sent it to the client. 7 The court did the same for a
lawyer who violated the rule against concurrent conflicts of interest by
naming himself as a plaintiff in a case he filed on behalf of clients who
had been defrauded.5 8 A lawyer who did not return client phone calls,
showed up late for court, did not return fees or the file after being
terminated, and inadvertently misstated facts in his response to the
grievance also received a Review Panel reprimand.59 Another lawyer
received the same sanction because he did not send all discovery
materials to a client, became inaccessible to the client for a period of
time, even after the client fired him, and failed to provide new counsel
with the client's file.6'
A petition for voluntary discipline led to a Review Panel reprimand for
a lawyer who represented a client over a period of years but failed to
adequately document the time he spent on her financial matters or to
communicate with her regarding how her financial objectives were to be
accomplished.61 Another lawyer received the same punishment because
twice he falsified his client's signature on documents and notarized
them.62 Finally, a lawyer received a Review Panel reprimand because

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

In re Hanzelik, 289 Ga. 391, 391-92, 711 S.E.2d 692, 692-93 (2011).
In re King, 289 Ga. 457, 457-58, 712 S.E.2d 70, 70 (2011).
In re Turner, 289 Ga. 563, 564, 713 S.E.2d 867, 868 (2011).
In re Jones, 289 Ga. 833, 833-34, 716 S.E.2d 208, 209 (2011).
In re Free, 290 Ga. 75, 76, 717 S.E.2d 480, 481 (2011).
In re Elrod, 290 Ga. 80, 80, 717 S.E.2d 479, 479-80 (2011).
In re Olczak, 290 Ga. 371, 371-72, 720 S.E.2d 641, 641-42 (2012).
In re Davis, 291 Ga. 169, 170, 728 S.E.2d 548, 549 (2012).
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she failed to file a workers' compensation claim for a client before the
statute of limitations expired and on occasion did not return the client's
phone calls.63
The court ordered three public reprimands during the survey period.
The court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline from a lawyer who
did not act diligently in two matters at a time when the lawyer was
suffering from alcoholism; the lawyer had addressed his addiction
through Alcoholics Anonymous, a substance abuse facility, and the
Lawyer's Assistance Program."
In another case, the court accepted a voluntary petition for discipline
and ordered a public reprimand for a lawyer who notarized a document
for a client's father when the father was not in his presence. 65 The
court did the same for a lawyer who failed to act diligently and
communicate with one immigration client and failed to communicate
adequately with a second.6"
D. Other Matters
The supreme court decided three matters related to attorney admission and rejected three petitions for voluntary discipline. The court
granted a certification of fitness to re-admit an attorney who was
disbarred in 2003 because he had pled guilty in 2000 to federal tax
crimes; the lawyer was certified because he showed remorse, engaged in
volunteer work, and otherwise demonstrated that he was rehabilitated.67 A bar applicant, however, was denied such a certification. 6' The
applicant had an extensive criminal history, had not revealed all of it in
connection with his law school application, and stated on his fitness
application that he did not have any condition or impairment involving
substance abuse that, if left untreated, would affect his ability to
practice law.69 In fact, the applicant was a recovering alcoholic who
regularly attended 12-step meetings.7 ° The court ruled that the
applicant had not carried his burden to demonstrate his fitness.71
Another applicant was denied a certification of fitness because he
omitted criminal history information from both his law school application

63. In re Brown-Williams, 290 Ga. 530, 530-31, 722 S.E.2d 740, 740 (2012).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

In re Adams, 291 Ga. 173, 173-75, 729 S.E.2d 313, 313-14 (2012).
In re Swain, 290 Ga. 678, 678-79, 725 S.E.2d 244, 245 (2012).
In re Farris, 291 Ga. 98, 98-99, 727 S.E.2d 503, 504 (2012).
In re Stein, 290 Ga. 435, 435-36, 721 S.E.2d 898, 898-99 (2012).
In re Payne, 289 Ga. 746, 749, 715 S.E.2d 139, 142 (2011).
Id. at 746-47, 715 S.E.2d at 139-41.
Id. at 747, 715 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 748, 715 S.E.2d at 141-42.
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and his fitness application, was not candid about why he had done so,
and displayed a lack of maturity and judgment in connection with a law
school internship.7 2
The court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline because the court
held that, because the lawyer had essentially neglected three matters for
clients and had an extensive disciplinary history, a six-month suspension
would not be sufficient. 73 The court rejected another petition in which
the attorney admitted that he had failed to act diligently and to
communicate adequately in one matter; the court specifically noted that
the attorney had not returned part of the retainer as promised to the
client. 74 Finally, the court rejected a petition for a Review Panel
reprimand from an attorney who failed to maintain a trust account for
sixteen years, failed to keep appropriate records of client and trust
funds, and failed to surrender disputed funds in one case for over two
years.75
II. MALPRACTICE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided five significant cases during the
survey period regarding claims of malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty
against attorneys. 76 Four of these cases involved issues of causation,
while the fifth concerned whether a claim for legal malpractice is
assignable.
In Whiteside v. Decker, Hallman, Barber & Briggs, R C., 77 the
plaintiff was a trustee in bankruptcy. The debtor had caused an

72. In re Yunker, Jr., 289 Ga. 636, 637-39, 715 S.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2011).
73. In re Boykin, 290 Ga. 871, 871, 873, 725 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (2012).
74. In re Glenn, 291 Ga. 49, 49-50, 727 S.E.2d 495, 495-96 (2012). The Author was

appointed by the supreme court as the special master in this case. The admissions recited
in the text are admissions noted by the court in its opinion rejecting the petition for
voluntary discipline and do not indicate any prejudgment of any factual matter in this case.
75. In re Ibrahim, 291 Ga. 94, 95, 727 S.E.2d 501, 502 (2012).
76. The court issued two opinions in malpractice cases that are worthy only of a
passing mention. In Fortson v. Freeman, 313 Ga. App. 326, 721 S.E.2d 607 (2011), the
court construed all the causes of action alleged as professional negligence and affirmed the
dismissal of the case for failure to file an expert affidavit. Id. at 326, 721 S.E.2d at 608.
In the other case, the court affirmed a judgment against an attorney in a malpractice case
when the attorney's only points of error involved the admissibility of two items of evidence.
Hart v. Groves, 311 Ga. App. 587, 588-89, 716 S.E.2d 631, 632-33 (2011). As to one of
them, the lawyer waived any error because he never obtained a ruling at trial on its
admissibility. Id. at 588, 716 S.E.2d at 632. With respect to the other, the court held that
the hearsay evidence was admitted for a non-hearsay purpose and that, even if it was error
to admit it, the error was harmless. Id. at 588-89, 716 S.E.2d at 632-33.
77. 310 Ga. App. 16, 712 S.E.2d 87 (2011). The Author served as an expert witness for
the plaintiff in this case.
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automobile accident that killed one person and injured two others,
including a passenger, Moreno, who suffered severe head injuries.
Moreno's guardian sued the driver (the debtor), and Infinity Casualty
Insurance Company (Infinity) undertook the defense of the case because
it insured the owner of the car. Infinity hired Decker, Hailman, Barber
& Briggs to handle the case.7"
Infinity allegedly failed in bad faith to settle the driver's claim for the
policy limits of $15,000, and eventually Moreno obtained a judgment
against the driver (and debtor) for $8 million. Once the driver filed
bankruptcy, Moreno became a creditor of the bankruptcy estate. The
trustee sued Infinity on the bad-faith claim, and that suit netted $4.5
million of the $8 million the estate owed to Moreno. The trustee then
sued the Decker Hallman firm and partner Winston Briggs to recover
the remaining debt of the estate to Moreno. The trustee alleged that the
defendants breached fiduciary duties to the debtor (who was their client
in the underlying case) by not advising him that he had a bad faith
claim against Infinity (who was paying the lawyers to represent the driver), by taking affirmative measures to extinguish that claim, and by
advising Infinity that it had no bad faith liability to their client. 9
The trial court and the court of appeals assumed without deciding that
the law firm and Mr. Briggs breached their fiduciary duties but held
that the trustee had not established that any such breaches caused any
damage to the client.' The trustee's evidence of causation came from
an insurance expert who concluded that, but for the breaches of fiduciary
duty (and assuming the law firm and Briggs had withdrawn from the
representation because of a conflict of interest), the debtor would have
obtained an independent lawyer who would have been able to convince
Infinity to settle Moreno's claim for an amount in excess of the policy
limits."' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that
this opinion had to be disregarded as "wholly speculative." 2 Without
proof of causation, the trustee lost.'
In Quarterman v. Cullum," the plaintiff hired an attorney to
represent him in a case against the client's brother about the will of the
client's mother. In the underlying case, the court entered an order that
the plaintiff could take the deposition of his brother during a six-month

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 16-17, 712 S.E.2d at 88-89.
Id. at 17-18, 712 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 18, 712 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 19, 712 S.E.2d at 90.
Id.
Id. at 20-21, 712 S.E.2d at 90-91.
311 Ga. App. 800, 717 S.E.2d 267 (2011).
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period upon showing good cause. The deposition was not taken, the
plaintiff lost the case, and the plaintiff sued his lawyer for malpractice
because the lawyer did not take the deposition.' The court of appeals
affirmed a summary judgment for the lawyer because the plaintiff
offered no evidence of what testimony the deposition would have elicited
or how any such evidence would have affected the result of the
case." Without such proof of causation, the plaintiffs claim
underlying
7
failed.
In Duncan v. Klein," the plaintiff sought advice from an attorney
regarding a possible claim of employment discrimination. When the
lawyer advised that the plaintiff had no claim, the plaintiff resigned his
job and, at great direct and indirect expense, went to law school far from
home. In law school, the plaintiff learned that, in fact, he could sue his
former employer, and he did so. The plaintiff settled that case and then
sued the lawyer for malpractice. He claimed the lawyer's negligence
caused him to forego a claim of constructive discharge, which "caused"
him to go to law school.8 9
The court of appeals rejected both arguments, finding first that the
plaintiff could have asserted his constructive discharge in the case he
brought against his former employer.9 As to the second claim, the
court concluded:
If Duncan had decided instead to remake himself as a fisherman,
would anyone seriously contend that Klein and the firm owe him a boat
and a dock? If Duncan had decided to become a professional gambler,
would anyone seriously contend that they owe him a six-figure stake
at the Bellagio? We doubt it. That one loses his job because his lawyer
makes a mistake does not mean that he is entitled to remake his life,
however he sees fit, and at whatever cost, on the dime of the lawyer.
The claim of such an entitlement is preposterous. 9'
The court affirmed the summary judgment against the plaintiff.92
In the last of the causation cases, the court reversed an interlocutory
ruling of a trial court that excluded expert testimony about the likely

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 801, 717 S.E.2d at 268-69.
Id. at 805-06, 717 S.E.2d at 271-72.
Id. at 806, 717 S.E.2d at 272.
313 Ga. App. 15, 720 S.E.2d 341 (2011).
Id. at 15, 720 S.E.2d at 343.
Id. at 19-20, 720 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. at 23, 720 S.E.2d at 348 n.7.
Id. at 24, 720 S.E.2d at 349.
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outcome of the "case-within-[the]-case." 93 The lawyer had sued the
wrong defendant on a wrongful death claim. The plaintiff sought to
introduce expert testimony that the plaintiffs would have recovered
$500,000 in the wrongful death case if it had been handled correctly.
The trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, but
the court of appeals reversed that ruling. 4 The court applied its recent
ruling in Johnson v. Leibel (since unanimously overruled)9 5 that such
testimony is admissible if "a lay person could not competently determine
whether or not the negligence of the attorney proximately caused the
plaintiff's damages, i.e., whether the plaintiff would have prevailed in
the underlying action."96
In Villanueva v. First American 7tle Insurance Co.," the court of
appeals decided a question of first impression: whether legal malpractice
claims are assignable in Georgia.9" The lawyer had closed a real estate
transaction, but before the prior lienholder could be paid off from the
proceeds, the money was taken from the firm's trust account. The title
insurance company paid off the prior lienholder and, by a contractual
assignment, asserted a claim against the lawyer for committing
malpractice in the transaction.99 The court of appeals applied the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 44-12-24 (O.C.G.A.)'0 ° and
held that such claims are assignable because they are for property loss
rather than for injury to the person, reputation, or feelings.' 01 The
court also rejected an argument that the lawyer was not liable because
of the intervening criminal act by which someone else took the money
from the trust account. °2 The court held that there was a jury issue
whether such an act was foreseeable because the lawyer admittedly had

93. Tidwell v. Hinton & Powell, 315 Ga. App. 152, 152, 154, 726 S.E.2d 652, 652-54
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 152, 720 S.E.2d at 653.
95. 307 Ga. App. 32, 703 S.E.2d 702 (2010), rev'd, 291 Ga. 180 (2012).
96. Tidwell, 315 Ga. App. at 153, 726 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Leibel, 307 Ga. App. at
38, 703 S.E.2d at 709).
97. 313 Ga. App. 164, 721 S.E.2d 150 (2011), cert. granted.
98. Id. at 168, 721 S.E.2d at 155.
99. Id. at 165-66, 721 S.E.2d at 152-53.
100. O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 (2002).
101. Villanueva, 313 Ga. App. at 168, 721 S.E.2d at 155. O.C.G. § 44-12-24 provides
that "[eixcept for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right
of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. A right of
action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be
assigned." O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24.
102. Villanueva, 313 Ga. App. at 169-70, 721 S.E.2d at 155-56.
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the
some concerns about that person's access to the trust account1 before
4
money was taken. 3 The court remandedthe case for trial.
III.

INEFFECTiVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Georgia Supreme Court
The Georgia Supreme Court decided five significant cases during the
survey period related to ineffective assistance of counsel."0 5 In Johnson v. State,"° the court concluded that the defendant had not been
adequately advised regarding a plea offer."0 7 The state offered to
accept a plea in exchange for a twenty-five-year sentence. The
defendant was informed of the offer but was not advised that it would
be withdrawn if not accepted before the defendant pleaded not guilty.
He was also not advised that the charges carried the potential of a
mandatory life sentence without parole. The defendant's counsel also
did not conduct an examination of the facts necessary to give informed
advice to the defendant. Once the defendant learned that his alibi
witnesses were not going to be helpful, and learned about the possibility
of the mandatory life sentence, he authorized his counsel to make a
counteroffer. When the counteroffer was rejected, defense counsel sought
to accept the original offer, but the assistant district attorney replied
that the offer was withdrawn as a matter of office policy once the
defendant pleaded not guilty.'0 8
The court held that the failure to conduct a sufficient examination of
the facts and to inform the client of both the possibility of a mandatory
life sentence and the district attorney's policy of revoking offers
constituted ineffective assistance.0 9 The court also held that the

A.

103. Id. at 169, 721 S.E.2d at 156.
104. Id. at 170, 721 S.E.2d at 156.
105. One other case is worthy of a brief mention. In State v. Abernathy, the supreme
court assumed without deciding that there was a conflict of interest for a public defender
when another lawyer in the same circuit defender's office had represented someone else
charged in connection with the same events. State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 604, 715
S.E.2d 48, 51 (2011). The court found no prejudice and noted that the conflict issue is
squarely before the court in In re Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1, No. S10U1679
(docketed July 1, 2010). Abernathy, 289 Ga. at 604-05, 715 S.E.2d at 51-52.
106. 289 Ga. 532, 712 S.E.2d 811 (2011).
107. Id. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814. It should be noted that during the survey period the
United States Supreme Court decided two important cases regarding plea offers and
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
108. Johnson, 289 Ga. at 533-34, 712 S.E.2d at 812-13.
109. Id. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814.
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defendant had shown harm because he did attempt to accept the original
offer once his counteroffer. was rejected.10 The court remanded for
"further proceedings consistent with this opinion" without elaborating on
what those proceedings would be. 1 ' Justices Melton and Hines
dissented because the defendant made a counteroffer." 2 Therefore,
they concluded, the defendant could not prove that there was a
reasonable probability that he would have accepted the original offer if
he had been properly advised at the time." 8
The court reversed four cases in which the habeas courts had upheld
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two of the cases involved
appellate counsel. In Walker v. Hagins,"' the lawyer had neglected to
ensure that the transcript of a hearing on a motion to dismiss the jury
panel was included in the record on appeal."5 The habeas court
presumed prejudice, but the supreme court held that a showing of
prejudice was necessary and that its own examination
of the missing
116
transcript showed no harm to the defendant.
In Arrington v. Collins,"7 the petitioner claimed that appellate
counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise several arguments in
the appeal."' The habeas court found ineffective assistance and harm,

110. Id. at 535-36, 712 S.E.2d qt 814.
111. Id. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814. Interestingly, the remedy in these situations is a
difficult and open question because of the trial court's power to reject an agreed-upon plea
bargain. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1396 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
It is impossible to conclude discussion of today's extraordinary opinion without
commenting upon the remedy it provides for the unconstitutional conviction. It is
a remedy unheard-of in American jurisprudence-and, I would be willing to bet,
in the jurisprudence of any other country.
The Court requires Michigan to "reoffer the plea agreement" that was rejected
because of bad advice from counsel. That would indeed be a powerful remedy-but for the fact that Cooper's acceptance of that reoffered agreement is not
conclusive. Astoundingly, "the state trial court can then exercise its discretion in
determining whether to vacate the convictions and resentence respondent
pursuant to the plea agreement, to vacate only some of the convictions and
resentence respondent accordingly, or to leave the convictions and sentence from
trial undisturbed."
Id. (quoting the majority opinion) (citations omitted).
112. Johnson, 289 Ga. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814 (Melton & Hines, JJ., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. 290 Ga. 512, 722 S.E.2d 725 (2012).
115. Id. at 512, 722 S.E.2d at 727.
116. Id. at 515, 722 S.E.2d at 728-29.
117. 290 Ga. 603, 724 S.E.2d 372 (2012).
118. Id. at 603, 724 S.E.2d at 373.
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but the supreme court reversed because the tactical omission of these
arguments was within the range of reasonableness.""
In Hambrick v. Brannen, 2 the habeas court found counsel deficient
because he had not investigated his client's mental health history in
connection with a probation revocation hearing and that, if he had done
so, there would have been a reasonable probability of a different
outcome. 2 ' The supreme court ruled there was error as to both
prongs.1 22 First, the lawyer was not ineffective, because the decision
not to pursue the insanity defense came after a sufficient investigation8
and adequate consultation with the defendant and his family.12
Second, the court determined that there was no prejudice because the
record did not reveal what a more thorough investigation of the client's
mental health would have found or how it might have affected the
proceeding."2
Finally, in Humphrey v. Morrow,26 the court reversed the habeas
court's decision and reinstated the death penalty. 26 Trial counsel
allegedly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the defendant's early life and failed to present psychological and forensic evidence
that would have made a significant difference in the probability of a
guilty verdict and a recommendation of death. 127 The supreme court
rejected all of these arguments, finding that the investigation was
reasonable, that the psychologist's testimony would not have had a
significant impact, and that the lack of forensic evidence was not
prejudicial because it would have been cumulative, not helpful to the
defendant, and less credible than the expert testimony that was
The court finally held that there was no reasonable
presented.'
probability that the lawyer's failure to object to a confusing sentencing
verdict form caused harm because "there is no reasonable probability
that the jury would have imposed anything less than two separate death
had successfully objected
sentences for the two murders if trial" counsel
129
to the form of the sentencing verdict.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 608, 724 S.E.2d at 377.
289 Ga. 682, 715 S.E.2d 89 (2011).
Id. at 682-83, 715 S.E.2d at 90-91.
Id. at 684-85, 715 S.E.2d at 91-92.
Id. at 683-84, 715 S.E.2d at 91.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 684-85, 715 S.E.2d at 92.
289 Ga. 864, 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011).
Id. at 877, 717 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 870, 717 S.E.2d at 175.
Id. at 870, 873, 717 S.E.2d at 175, 177.
Id. at 874-75, 717 S.E.2d at 178.
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Georgia Court of Appeals

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided three
ineffectiveness cases that are worthy of note. 3 ° These cases involved
guilty pleas and warrant mention in light of the attention that the
Supreme Court of the United States gave two claims of ineffectiveness
32
in connection with guilty pleas last term.' 3' In Badger v. State,"
the defense lawyer apparently never conveyed an offer of a five-year
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. There was significant evidence
that the client had been adamant that he was not guilty and would not
accept any plea bargain." The trial court was critical of the lawyer
for not conveying the offer, but both the trial court and the court of
appeals agreed that there was no reasonable probability that the
defendant
would have accepted it.1' There was, therefore, no preju35

dice. 1

Similarly, in Roseborough v. State,136 the defense lawyer in a child
molestation case mistakenly agreed with the judge's comment that the
minimum sentence was one year rather than five years. However, the
defendant testified at the hearing on his ineffectiveness claim that the
mistake did not make a difference to him because he did not want to
38

plead guilty at

all. 13'

Finally, the defendant in Bailey v. State

complained that his counsel was not available to discuss an offer that
the defendant initially rejected, but the defendant could provide no
130. In another routine case, the court upheld a claim of ineffective assistance when
an attorney failed to make a directed verdict motion when the State's own evidence showed
that the defendant was not guilty of one of the many counts brought against him. Murray
v. State, 315 Ga. App. 653, 655-56, 727 S.E.2d 267, 268-69 (2012).
131. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376.

132. 310 Ga. App. 157, 712 S.E.2d 582 (2011).
133. Id. at 157-58, 712 S.E.2d at 583-84.
134. Id. at 159-60, 712 S.E.2d at 584-85. It bears noting that when these events
transpired, Comment 1A to Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 stated that a lawyer
who receives a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case "should" convey the offer unless

the client has made it clear in prior discussions that the deal would be unacceptable. See
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. A, reprintedin State Bar of Georgia, Directory
& Handbook, GA. B.J. Vol. 16 no. 3 (2010-2011) (Special Issue) (text of Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct before they were amended in 2011). The word "should" now has been
changed to "must" in the new Comment 2 to Rule 1.4, but the lawyer is still permitted not
to convey offers that the client has authorized the lawyer to reject. See GA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2011), availableat http-/gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail-

.cfm~what--rule&id=54.
135. Badger, 310 Ga. App. at 160, 712 S.E.2d at 585.

136. 311 Ga. App. 456, 716 S.E.2d 530 (2011).
137. Id. at 458-59, 716 S.E.2d at 532-33.

138. 313 Ga. App. 824, 723 S.E.2d 55 (2012).
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evidence that the offer was even still in effect when he claimed to have
been unable to discuss the matter with his lawyer.'3 9 Therefore, he
could show no deficient performance or harm, particularly since he never
showed any intent to accept the offer when it was open."4
IV. DISQUALIFICATION
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two significant disqualification
cases during the survey period. In Lewis v. State,"" the trial court
disqualified Alston & Bird from representing the defendant because the
State identified an employee of a corporate client of that firm as a
witness.'
Under Wheat v. United States, 143 the prosecution has
standing to overcome the presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel
of choice and seek disqualification of a defense lawyer only upon a
showing of a serious potential for conflict.14 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's order because the prosecution had not made
such a showing. 145 In particular, there was no evidence that the
corporate client whose employee would be cross-examined by an Alston
& Bird lawyer in the criminal trial was such an important client, or
would be so put off by the cross-examination, that Alston & Bird would
be reluctant to cross-examine vigorously.146 The court described the
record on this point as "one conjecture piled upon another" and
reversed. 4"
In Greater Georgia Amusements, LLC v. Georgia,14 the court of
appeals invalidated the appointment of private lawyers as special
assistant district attorneys because the attorneys were working under
a contingent fee arrangement. 49 The district attorney had agreed to
pay the lawyers one-third of the gross amount recovered for the state
(and forty percent if an appeal was necessary) in forfeiture actions
involving convenience stores that had gaming machines. 50 Although
the court held that the district attorney had the power to appoint the
lawyers as special assistant district attorneys, the court voided the

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 826-28, 723 S.E.2d at 57-58.
Id. at 829, 723 S.E.2d at 59.
312 Ga. App. 275, 718 S.E.2d 112 (2011).
Id. at 275-76, 718 S.E.2d at 113.
486 U.S. 153 (1988).
Id. at 164.
Lewis, 312 Ga. App. at 290, 718 S.E.2d at 123.
Id. at 289, 718 S.E.2d at 122-23.
Id. at 289-90, 718 S.E.2d at 123.
728 S.E.2d 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 745.
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contingent fee arrangement because it guaranteed "at least the
appearance of a conflict of interest" between a district attorney's "public
duty to seek justice and his private right to obtain compensation for his
services." 1 ' The court also noted that the Georgia legislature has now
forbidden such contingent fee arrangements with attorneys for the state
in forfeiture actions. 52
V. JUDICIAL CONDUCT 153
In Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co.,' the
Georgia Supreme Court decided a significant case involving recusal. In
Georgia, Uniform Superior Court Rule 25155 sets forth the procedure
for a motion to recuse.'
The rule requires a written motion and
affidavits, and the trial judge must determine whether the papers are
timely, whether they are legally sufficient, and whether a recusal would
be warranted if all the facts are true.'5 7 If the answer to all of these
questions is yes, then the judge must refer the motion to another judge
for decision. 5 ' In the City of Savannah case, the trial judge made no
finding as to timeliness but ruled that the affidavits were not legally
sufficient and did not state a basis for recusal.'59 The supreme court
reversed. 6 ' The court noted first that the proper standard for review
of a trial judge's decision under Rule 25 is de novo, and the court
overruled cases that had used an abuse of discretion standard.' 6 '
Using that standard, the court reversed the trial judge's decision and
described the circumstances:
In the case before us, the familial relationship between the judge and
an attorney who had represented one of the parties in the underlying
dispute that resulted in the litigation and who was employed by a firm,

151. Id. at 746-47.
152. Id. at 745 n.2.
153. In addition to the cases noted in the text, there was one additional significant case
involving judicial conduct. The supreme court permanently removed a magistrate judge
from office because of numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including drug
use, misuse of his office, and actions that did not promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. In re Judge Anthony Peters, 289 Ga. 633, 636,715 S.E.2d
56, 58 (2011).
154. 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012).
155. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 25 (2012).
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Savannah, 291 Ga. at 116, 728 S.E.2d at 192.
160. Id. at 122, 728 S.E.2d at 195.
161. Id. at 119-20, 728 S.E.2d at 194.
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a partner of which was general counsel to a party in the case, who
acted at times as if counsel of record, and whose conversation with the
trial judge advising him of the existence of the case was followed by the
trial judge's assignment of the case to himself, are objective facts which
we conclude would cause a fair-minded and impartial person to have
a reasonable perception of the trial judge's lack of impartiality. 62
The supreme court also decided one case during the survey period
involving the proper bounds of a judge's involvement in a case, while the
163
Georgia Court of Appeals decided two such cases. In Pride v. Kemp,
the supreme court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant whose
guilty plea was found to have been involuntary as a result of the judge's
comments.'" The judge had rejected a plea bargain under which the
defendant would serve thirteen years and told the defendant the
minimum sentence in a plea would be twenty years. 65 The court told
the defendant that if he was convicted at trial the sentence would be the
"maximum" and the judge would "stack the sentences."'6 6 The judge
also expressed a hope that the defendant would choose to go to trial so
"I can give him what I would really like to give him." 67 Under these
held that the defendant's
circumstances, the supreme court unanimously
168
decision to plead guilty was not voluntary.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction of a defendant who opted
for a bench trial after the judge told him that the sentence would be the
minimum if the defendant waived his right to jury trial but also said
that after a jury trial, "I am not bound by anything I said I would do at
the end of a bench trial, the maximum you could get would be ... 41
years." 69 The trial court also advised the defendant that if the
defendant chose a jury trial the court would take into account "the fact
that the time of the court is being used" and noted that "during a jury
trial I find out a lot more information about a case." ° The court of
appeals found no authority directly on point but concluded, by analogy
to Pride, that the standard was whether the trial court's statements
made the waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial involuntary.17 ' The court concluded that there was a substantial likelihood of

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 121, 728 S.E.2d at 195.
289 Ga. 353, 711 S.E.2d 653 (2011).
Id. at 353, 711 S.E.2d at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 354, 711 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 355, 711 S.E.2d at 655.
Ealey v. State, 310 Ga. App. 893, 896-99, 714 S.E.2d 424, 426-27 (2011).
Id. at 896, 714 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 898, 714 S.E.2d at 427.
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undue
influence and reversed the conviction that followed the bench
172
trial.
Finally, in Price v. State,'17 a judge's involvement in a case also led
to a reversal. 174 The defendant was convicted of obtaining controlled
substances by fraudulent means but contended that she had the doctor's
permission to phone in the refills in question. The case turned entirely
on the credibility of the witnesses. 175 At one point, the judge asked a
defense witness, "[aire you lying under oath up here?" and, "[elverything
you've said has been truthful?"'76 The court of appeals held that these
questions "clearly intimated" the judge's opinion about the credibility of
the witness'7 7 and thus violated the judge's statutory duty not to
"express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved
or as to the179guilt of the accused."' 78 The court reversed the defendant's
conviction.

VI.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided three
miscellaneous cases that are worthy of note. In Eichholz Law Firm v.
Tate Law Group,8 ' the question was whether a joint venture agreement to share contingent fees between two law firms was enforceable
after the clients discharged one of the firms.' 8' The court noted that
Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5182 allows fee-splitting only if
the client "does not object to the participation of all the lawyers
involved," and the court took the discharge by the clients of one of the
firms to be such an objection." 4 The agreement could not be enforced."

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 899, 714 S.E.2d at 427-28.
310 Ga. App. 132, 712 S.E.2d 135 (2011).
Id. at 135, 712 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 132, 712 S.E.2d at 135-36.
Id. at 133, 712 S.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 134, 712 S.E.2d at 137.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2008).
Price, 310 Ga. App. at 135, 712 S.E.2d at 138.
310 Ga. App. 848, 714 S.E.2d 413 (2011).
Id. at 850, 714 S.E.2d at 415.

182.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2011).

183.

Eichholz, 310 Ga. App. at 851,714 S.E.2d at 415-16; see also GA. RULES OF PROF'L

178.

CONDUCT R. 1.5(eX2).

184. Eichholz, 310 Ga. App. at 852-53, 714 S.E.2d at 417.
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In Outlaw v. Rye," s the court of appeals declined to enforce an
attorney's lien" asserted under O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14., s7 Because the
property against which the lien was filed was not recovered by the
lawyer, the statutory lien could not be enforced. Nor did it matter that
the lawyer and the client had a contract that provided that, if the
attorney's fees were not paid, the client's property would be "deemed" to
The court of appeals rejected
have been recovered by the lavyer.1
the argument that the lien statute effectively could be amended by
agreement of the lawyer and client; the court affirmed the dismissal of
the lawyer's petition to foreclose on the lien.' s
Finally, the court of appeals decided one case about the standard for
recovery of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14,'90 which governs
recovery of attorney fees for "fivolous actions and defenses."' 9 ' The
court reversed the trial court's award of fees against a losing party when
that party's argument was not "nonsensical, illogical, foreclosed by
existing precedent, or without some arguable support in the case law
and statutes."' 9 The court noted that the purpose of the statute is to
"discourage the bringing of frivolous claims, not the presentation of
questions of first impression about which reasonable minds might
disagree or the assertion of novel legal theories that find arguable, albeit
limited, support in the existing case law and statutes."'93 Because the
plaintiff had not advanced such frivolous claims or theories, the court
reversed the award of attorney fees against it.1'9

185. 312 Ga. App. 579, 718 S.E.2d 905 (2011).
186. Id. at 580, 718 S.E.2d at 906.
187. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 (2012). The statute provides:
Upon all actions for the recovery of real or personal property and upon all
judgments or decrees for the recovery of the same, attorneys at law shall have a
lien for their fees on the property recovered superior to all liens except liens for
taxes, which may be enforced by mortgage and foreclosure by the attorneys at law
or their lawful representatives as liens on personal property and real estate are
enforced. The property recovered shall remain subject to the liens unless
transferred to bona fide purchasers without notice.
Id. § 15-19-14(c).
188. Outlaw, 312 Ga. App. at 580-82, 718 S.E.2d at 907-08.
189. Id. at 582-83, 718 S.E.2d at 908.
190. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2006).
191. Gibson Constr. Co.v. GAA Acquisitions I, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 674,675, 725 S.E.2d
806, 808 (2012); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.
192. Gibson, 314 Ga. App. at 677-78, 725 S.E.2d at 810.
193. Id. at 677, 725 S.E.2d at 810.
194. Id. at 677-78, 725 S.E.2d at 810.
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DECISIONS OF THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD

The Annual Report of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar
of Georgia contains a full report of the actions of the Formal Advisory
Opinion Board during the survey period.' 95 Four items bear mention
here. In Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1,196 the Board concluded that
different lawyers employed in the same circuit public defender's office
may not represent co-defendants if one lawyer could not do so. 97 That
opinion remained pending for discretionary review with the Georgia
Supreme Court throughout the survey period. 9 8 The supreme court
approved one advisory opinion, which requires a lawyer who has been
appointed as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child to seek
to be removed as the child's guardian if the attorney concludes that the
child's instructions to the lawyer conflict with the child's best interest. 199 Finally, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board accepted a request
for drafting a formal advisory opinion to answer the question whether
"a Georgia lawyer who participates in a piecemeal element of a Georgia
residential real estate transaction where neither he nor other Georgia
lawyers will supervise the other aspects of the closing process violate the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct."20 0

195. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR
OPERATIONAL YEAR 2011-2012, availableat http:/www.gabar.orgbarrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/2011-12-OGC-Annual-Reportpdf.
196. Id. at 19.
197. Id.
198. Id. It should be noted in this regard that the State Bar of Georgia has asked the
Georgia Supreme Court to amend Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10 to add a
section (d). That new section would state, "A lawyer representing a client of a public
defender office shall not be disqualified under this rule because of the representation by
the office of another client in the same or a substantially related matter unless there is a
conflict as defined by Rules 1.7, 1.8(f) or 1.9." Cliff Brashier, Notice of Motion to Amend
the Rules and Regulationsof the State Bar of Georgia, 17 GA. B.J. 64, 65 (Dec. 2011). The
amendment makes no substantive change. In effect, it states that no conflict will be
imputed to a fellow public defender when there is no conflict to impute. The Author is a
member of the State Bar of Georgia Disciplinary Rules and Procedures Committee, which
drafted the proposed change, and this interpretation of the proposed amendment is
personal and not necessarily representative of the views of the Committee or its other
members.
199. In re Formal Advisory Opinion 10-2, available at http:/www.gasupreme.us/scop/pdfIs11u0730.pdf; STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 195, at 18.
200. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 195, at 17. The required role
of Georgia lawyers in real estate transactions has been the focus of attention before. In In
re UPLAdvisory Opinion 2003-2, the court stated that under Georgia law, the preparation
of a document that serves to secure a legal right is considered the practice of law. The
execution of a deed of conveyance, because it is an integral part of the real estate closing
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VIII.

211

AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court amended a
number of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in light of changes
that the American Bar Association made to the Model Rules of Profes20 1
sional Ethics after the 2000 Commission completed its work.
Although a comprehensive review of all the changes is beyond the scope
of this Article, a few of the changes bear mentioning.
The new version defines "informed consent" and substitutes that
concept for "consent after consultation" in connection with several rules,
including Rule 1.6202 on release of confidential information and 1.7203
on waiver of conflicts of interest. 20 4 Rule 1.4205 has been expanded
to require lawyers to inform clients promptly about any matters that
require informed consent, to reasonably consult with the client about the
means to be used to achieve the client's objectives (mirroring the
preexisting duty to do so under Rule 1.2),206 and to consult with the

client about limitations on the lawyer's conduct if the client expects
assistance that would violate the Rules or other law.20 7 Other changes
include deletion of Rule 2.2 on the lawyer as intermediary, the addition
of a new rule on the lawyer as a third-party neutral,2 "8 and some
changes to the definition of misconduct with respect to criminal acts by
the lawyer.20 9 Finally, the major changes include new limits on the

process, is also the practice of law. As a general rule it would, therefore, be the unlicensed
practice of law for a non-lawyer to prepare or facilitate the execution of such deeds. In re
UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, available at http://www.gabar.orglbarrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=542.
201. See REVISIONS TO THE GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011)
availableat http'//www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/Execsumm2.pdf.
202.
203.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2011).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2011).

204. "Informed consent" is defined in the new rules as "the agreement by a person to
a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2011).
205. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2011).
206. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011).
207. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
208. GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 2.4 (2011).
209. Rule 8.4(a)(8) states that it is misconduct to "commit a criminal act that relates
to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio the
commission of such act." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(8) (2011).
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lawyer's obligation to notify third parties and deliver to them property
in the lawyer's possession , 2 ° a new option for a lawyer for an entity
to "report out" confidential information to protect the client,2 ' a slight
change of wording to the no-contact rule,2 12 and changes to the comment to that rule concerning contacts that may or may not be made with
constituents of a represented organization. 2 3
IX.

CONCLUSION

The survey period was an eventful one for court decisions and other
actions that relate to the professional responsibilities of Georgia lawyers.
In this area, as in all aspects of a lawyer's competence, "a lawyer should
engage in continuing study and education." 4

210. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(I)(b) (2011).
211. GA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(cX2) (2011).
212. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2(a) (2011).
213. GA. RuLEs OF PRoFiL CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4A. The full text of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct is available at http'J/www.gabar.org/barrules/georgia-rules-ofprofessional-conduct.cfm.
214. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2011).

